Two roles of futures markets have been empha-
T markets for nonstorable commodities are inefficient, In recent years, the efficiency of livestock futures that the speculators in these markets are not using all markets has received increased attention. Respondavailable information, and that ex ante welfare losses ing to producer concerns that futures markets are are incurred by society (Stein) . detrimental to the industry, researchers have examThis paper examines the live cattle and live hog ined the roles of livestock futures markets in discovfutures markets within the rational pricing frameering and forecasting prices, allocating resources to work suggested by Gray. At the outset, it is argued production, and registering market information that early in its life a livestock futures contract trades (Purcell and Hudson) . The results of these studies are in a price range around average costs of feeding. mixed and often depend on the time period and Early in the contract life is defined as the period method of analysis (Garcia et al. 1988a) . The availwhen the supply to be marketed during the delivery able research suggests difficulties in drawing definimonth can be influenced by the futures prices. Once tive conclusions about the efficiency of livestock the possibility of supply response is eliminated futures markets.
through production commitments (e.g., when the time to contract expiration is less than the length of Tomek and Gray integrate the allocative and forthe feeding period), then futures prices should adjust ward pricing roles of futures markets. They suggest to reflect market conditions expected to prevail at that futures markets for all commodities play both contract maturity. Prior to performing this forward roles to some degree and that the storage characpricing or forecasting role, futures contract prices teristics of the commodity determine the extent of should trade close to average costs of feeding. If they each role. For storable commodities, the role is prido not, they may elicit producer behavior which will marily allocative, but by influencing storage deciself-defeat the futures price. sions, futures prices become self-fulfilling forecasts. The paper is structured as follows. Previous literaFor semi-storable commodities, the futures market ture related to the forecasting performance of liveshould play an allocative role across the time period stock futures markets is briefly reviewed in the next that the crop is in storage (within crop year) but a section. In section three, the issue of rational price forward pricing role across periods when the crop is formation in futures markets is developed, and an not stored (across crop years). For nonstorable comempirical test is suggested. The models and data modities, such as livestock, the futures market employed in the study are discussed in the fourth should play a forward pricing role. The empirical section. Section five presents the empirical results of results of Tomek and Gray suggest that for Maine the inquiry. In section six, the implications of the potato futures prices (a semi-storable commodity), results for hedging strategies are discussed. The pathe allocative role is satisfied but the forward pricing per ends with concluding remarks.
role is not. They conclude that a simple cobweb model based on historic cash prices provides a better RELEVANT LITERATURE forecast than do futures prices. This characteristic, attributed to pricing inefficiency, persists in literaThe standard approach to assessing futures market ture examining nonstorable commodity futures marefficiency assumes that a market is efficient if prices kets. reflect all relevant and available information (Fama) .
Arguments are then made that if futures markets for
Gray later provides some rationalization as to why nonstorable commodities are performing the forfutures markets for nonstorable commodities are not ward pricing role efficiently, futures prices should be good forecasters. He suggests that "... production accurate forecasts of subsequent cash prices. The responds to current and recent prices, but if futures forecasting performance of livestock futures markets were to reflect the anticipation of this response they has been widely examined within this framework would necessarily abort it in that reflection" (p. 348). (see Kamara for a review of earlier research), most
Further, in response to the result that a cobweb model commonly by comparing the accuracy of price foreis a better predictor than futures markets, Gray states casting models to the accuracy of the futures market ". a futures market cannot reflect the backward in predicting subsequent prices (Leuthold; Leuthold oriented cobweb mechanism without evoking the and Hartmann; Just and Rausser; Martin and Garcia; responses and hence the prices which will prove that Garcia et al. 1988b; Shonkwiler) . reflection wrong" (p. 343). In other words, if prices Results of such analyses typically suggest that fufor distant futures contracts are good predictors of tures markets do not satisfy the efficiency criteria in expected market conditions, they will elicit supply a forecasting context and that the forecasting ability responses by producers, thereby negating the accuof futures markets deteriorates as the forecast horirate prediction. zon increases.
The literature on rational price formation, outside Interpretation of futures prices as forecasts has of evaluating forecasting performance, is relatively been questioned in the literature. Working contends limited. Only Miller and Kenyon (1977) and Purcell that futures prices are not forecasts and that any et al. attempt to examine the link between futures futures market cannot be a forecasting agency and a prices and cost of production in livestock markets. mechanism for rational price formation. However, This paper contributes to the literature by more carethis argument was made in a paper emphasizing the fully identifying why futures markets for nonstorallocative role of grain futures prices. This may have able commodities are not good forecasters, offering delayed application of the concept to nonstorable an alternative to the forward pricing role which commodities, the area where it may be most useful suggests that futures markets are pricing rationally (Peck 1987) . In general, livestock futures prices even if they do not forecast well at certain horizons, continue to be interpreted as a consensus of what and presenting an empirical test for rational price traders expect the cash price of the underlying comformation illustrated with data from live cattle and modity to be at contract expiration (Shonkwiler RATIONAL PRICE FORMATION market will not forecast if doing so elicits behavior that will prove the forecast wrong. Futures prices are more complex than a price forethatwillprovetheforecastwrong. cast. Futures contracts are used to facilitate merchanof rational price formation is suf ciently general to encompass the forward pricing dising of the underlying commodity, and there is ciently general to encompass the forward pricing arbitrage between the forecasting agency and agents role (see Figure ) . When a futures contract for a using the forecast. Arbitrage can be direct through nonstorablecommodityisnearmaturty, the forward hedging (Working) or indirect through the use of the pricing role is consistent with rational price formafutures price as an expected output price on which on e n e market take positions production decisions are based.t The implication is based on expected market conditions during the dee iproduction livery month. Futures prices for nearby contracts that futures contract prices can influence production that futures contract prices can influence should reflect underlying supply and demand infordecisions which in turn affect subsequent contract underlyg supply and demand information as that information becomes available. Howprices. The result is that the forecast can influence its own realization.
ever, prior to committing animals to feed, rational price formation suggests that the futures prices for Research on forecasting performance has tended distant and very distant contracts should trade to ignore this arbitrage and the fact that futures prices around expected and then actual average costs of are the result of trade between two economic agents.
production (see Figure 1) . Rational futures traders A buy and a sell decision takes place with each trade, should recognize that if price levels are above (beand trade is voluntary. If the post-trade price low) average costs of feeding prior to commitment changes, one of the two agents must lose money.
of animals to feed, the futures market may elicit an From a market equilibrium perspective, the cumulaincrease (decrease) in supply, and the subsequent tive effect of individual incentives should result in a futures price will be lower (higher) in the delivery market price that will not elicit direct or indirect month than current levels. Thus, the futures market arbitrage. Such arbitrage guarantees one of the should offer producers neither pure profits nor guaragents a loss and would be irrational.
2 This appears anteed losses prior to making feeding committo be the motivation for Working's original statements.
3 If futures contract prices reflect feeding ments about rational price formation. The futures costs, the futures market is rational because it reflects 1 Various analyses of feeding and marketing decisions made by cattle and hog producers suggest that these decisions are influenced by futures prices (Paul and Wesson; Ehrich; Miller and Kenyon 1977 and Hoffman; Leuthold) .
2 This argument is true for trade among all agents. In trade between two speculators, the idea is straightforward. In trade between a speculator and a hedger, the hedger may expect modest losses across many hedges, payment of a risk premium, but it would be irrational for the hedger consistently to guarantee losses in excess of the risk premium.
competitive market equilibrium conditions. This recontract (one year), imminent fed cattle and hog lationship is not covered by the forward pricing role. supplies are initially flexible and then become fixed. However, it does appear to be related to the allocative This should be true for marginal increases or derole.
creases in numbers of animals on feed. For cattle, There is a pool of resources available to produce flexibility in backgrounding programs suggests that fed animals. The futures market assists in allocating feeder animal supplies are flexible and that it is the these resources to production through providing commitment to finish the animal that fixes future price signals when production decisions are made.
supplies. With respect to hog feeding, production The futures market should recognize the competitive may be fixed when breeding decisions are made (ten nature of the feeding industry and, prior to the time to eleven months prior to marketing) or when pigs when animals can be committed to feed, contracts are placed on feed (four to six months prior to should be priced at levels comparable to costs exmarketing). pected at the time of commitment (see Figure 1) .
Second, throughout the earlier discussion, the conWhen the time to maturity of a futures contract is cepts of "committing animals to feed" and "fixing of equivalent to the length of the feeding period, the future supplies" were used interchangeably. In cattle contract should be priced to reflect current actual and hog feeding, animals marketed in any one month feeding costs. Further, the futures contract should must have been on feed rations for the prior four to continue to be priced at current feeding costs for the six months in order to achieve marketable weights length of the placement period-as long as a supply and quality. Further, once an animal is on feed, there response is possible. After producers make feeding are few economic alternatives other than continuing commitments, futures prices should mitigate the the feeding process. 4 Fed cattle supplies are arguably supply response, if placements are adequate, or enfixed once animals are placed on feed (typically four courage continued placements, if commitments are to six months prior to slaughter), although there is relatively small. In doing so, futures prices will begin some flexibility as to when animals are marketed to reflect anticipated market conditions. Livestock (plus or minus two weeks from the ideal finish date). futures markets should allocate resources to the feedMarket hog supplies become essentially fixed earing process by initially pricing future output at levels lier, sometime between the decision to breed sows equivalent to expected and then actual costs of pro-(ten to eleven months prior to slaughter of the market duction-recognizing the competitive equilibrium hog) and the decision to place pigs on feed (four condition. After resources are committed, the futures months prior to slaughter of the market hog). There market then begins to reflect anticipated market conis less flexibility in slaughter hog marketing. Empiriditions at contract expiration. If futures prices in cal results should reveal when supplies go from distant contract months reflect costs of production, being flexible to fixed by indicating when futures this would suggest that futures traders have rational prices no longer move with average feeding costs. expectations. In a competitive industry, where supThird, market performance studies typically do not ply commitments continue flexible, output should be separate the effects on prices of inadequate market priced equal to average costs of production. The use information and market inefficiency (Hudson et al.) . of the competitive market equilibrium condition to Research on how futures markets adjust to new formulate expectations about futures prices is an information (Miller; Schroeder et al.) and the effects underlying idea of the rational expectations concept of anticipated versus unanticipated information on (Dewbre) .
price (Colling and Irwin 1989 and 1990 ) is limited. Three further issues need to be addressed in movBecause there is a time lag between when feeding ing from the conceptual model to empirical tests of commitments are made and when information on rational price formation in live cattle and live hog production decisions becomes publicly available futures markets. These issues reflect assumptions (i.e., through USDA reports), there may be a lag implicit in the empirical tests of the conceptual between when the futures prices reflect feeding costs model. The assumptions are interrelated and introand when they reflect expected market conditions. duced from specific to the most general. First, there (The transition is illustrated by both sets of the are no barriers to entry in cattle and hog feeding.
overlapping dashed arrows in Figure 1 .) For examArguments above suggest that over the life of a pie, hog supplies may be fixed once breeding deci-sions have been made. However, live hog futures pounds of milo, 1500 pounds of corn, 400 pounds of may continue to reflect feeding costs until actual cotton seed meal, and 800 pounds of alfalfa hay over numbers of hogs on feed (i.e., market hogs) are six months and are sold at 1056 pounds (1100 publicly announced via USDA inventory reports.
pounds less 4 percent shrink). Corn Belt hog feeding This distinction is related to the second issue; it is budgets assume that 40-50 pound feeder pigs are important for interpretation of results, and it is a purchased and fed 11 bushels of corn and 130pounds researchable issue. However, it does not affect the of protein supplement over five months and are sold conceptualization of rational price formation or the at 220 pounds. All feed is assumed to be bought at empirical models.
the time of feeder animal purchase. The monthly Great Plains cattle feeding cost series was available MODELS AND DATA from February 1975 to the present. The monthly The test for rational price formation in the live Corn Belt hog feeding cost series was available from cattle and live hog futures markets used regressions July 1973 to the present. Futures contracts used in of feeding costs on futures contract prices. Monthly the analysis included all live cattle contracts traded feeding costs were regressed on futures prices at from the February 1975 through the December 1989 various months from delivery. The basic model was contract (excluding the illiquid January contracts), (1) FP (t -ik = oO + t VC* (t -j)k + Elk and all live hog contracts traded between their introduction with the June 1974 contract through the where i andj = 0,...,11 denote the months prior to the cton t te ne 19 contract trog t December 1989 contract. Averages of daily closing delivery month t. The observations are over futures contrc prices were constructed for each contract month and contracts and are denoted k. FP(t-i) denotes an avertt month a age monthly price of contracts expiring in month t ch calendar month across the 12-month trading with i months remaining for trade. VC(t-j) denotes horo The utres data were gathered from CME Yearbooks and the Wall Street Journal. There were aggregate U.S. variable costs of feeding in monthj,.Therewere aggreble costs offeeding in month 90 and 110 observations for each of the live cattle which isj months prior to the delivery month t of the futures price dependent variable. The model captures a v v the hypothesized equilibrium relationship between Evidence suggests that USDA budgets are systemaverage costs of feeding and futures prices. Shortatically different from actual feedlot production cost run competitive equilibrium suggests that prices are data (Trapp) . The difference is due to improvements related to average variable costs, while long-run in technical efficiency (e.g., gains from implants and equilibrium suggests that prices are related to avergenetics) and seasonal low cost substitutions by age total costs. The model represents an intermediate feedlot operators (e.g., varying feeds and types of relationship. The intercept will capture the portion feeder animals purchased among seasonal low cost of fixed costs reflected in equilibrium prices.
5 There alternatives). The difference between USDA variwere 12 models involved in the test reflecting futures able costs (VC) and aggregate U.S. variable costs contract prices over the 12-month horizon for which (VC*) was approximated with a cubic time trend and contracts were traded, i = 0,...,11 (j is specified series of monthly dummy variables. The expression below). The models were treated as a seemingly used to capture aggregate U.S. variable costs was unrelated regression system.
Variable production costs representative of Great Plains cattle feeding and Corn Belt hog feeding (2) VC (t-j)k=bo+VC(t-j)k+ tim trend m-1 operations were obtained from the USDA ERS LivestockandMeat Situation and Outlook. Variable feedc-1 ing costs were defined to be the feed and feeder
animal costs from USDA production budgets conm= 1 verted to dollar per hundredweight of live animal.
where Smk denotes seasonal dummies for (all but one Great Plains cattle feeding budgets assume that 600 of) the futures contracts traded per year, where C is pound feeder steers are purchased and fed 1500 six for cattle and seven for hogs. The trend variable 5 The final specification includes a trend variable which should capture possible longer-term changes in fixed costs. 6 This method should accurately capture costs incurred by commercial feeders. The cost of the feeder animal is 15 to 25 percent of total feeding costs and is incurred at placement. Allocating feed costs at prices observed at placement is appropriate if producers buy feed at placement or if producers hedge expected feed use at placement; grain futures contract prices across contract months are related primarily by storage costs. Thus, feed costs at placement and hedged feed costs are comparable. The practice of hedging total feed use at placement is common among commercial feeders. 7 There are six live cattle and seven live hog contracts traded per year.
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was based on the year and month of expiration and begin to take positions based on expected market thus captures the irregular temporal spacing of the conditions. Models in the very distant contract tradhog contracts. Substituting equation (2) into the reing horizon approximate expected costs with current gression (1) and combining parameters and error actual costs. This potential limitation was recogterms yields the estimable model:
nized. However, time series properties of the cost 3 data suggested that this approximation was appropri-(3) FP(t -i)k = Bo + P VC(t -j)k+ P2m tren ate. After trend and seasonality were accounted for, m=l autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations sug-C-1 rgested that the monthly cost series were essentiallỹ
Thus, the best forecast for costs one to 12 3m= mk I +k.
months ahead was the current actual cost level (given that the models incorporate trends and seasonality). The model was examined under two alternative Further, the potential limitation was lessened in that specifications ofj where (i = 0,...,1 1) resulting in two conclusions about rational price formation were systems of equations. The first system paired futures made cautiously with evidence from these very disprices with contemporaneous costs, or j = i. The tant contract month models. second system paired futures prices with incurred
The incurred cost system provided additional evicosts, or j = i for i greater than the feeding period.
dence about the presence of rational price formation. When i was less than the feeding period,j was equal This system should highlight the linkage between to the number of months in the feeding period. In futures prices and costs early in the contract life and other words, in the contemporaneous cost system, the deterioration of the relationship as futures confutures prices in the delivery month were modelled tracts mature. Correlations of error terms in the as a function of feeding costs in the delivery month; system will also illustrate whether futures contracts futures prices one month from delivery were modare priced so that self-defeating supply responses elled as a function of feeding costs one month from occur. Positive errors in the models imply that fudelivery. To complete the system, analogous models tures prices are at a premium to costs and that negawere constructed where futures prices two through tive errors imply a discount. Negative correlations eleven months from delivery were modelled as a between placement period model errors and delivery function of feeding costs two through eleven months month model errors imply that premiums (discounts) from delivery. In the incurred costs system, futures during the placement period trigger behavior by prices in the delivery month and all months between livestock feeders that results in discounts (premithe placement and delivery months were modelled ums) during the delivery month. as a function of feeding costs during the placement The necessary condition for rational price formamonth. To complete the incurred cost system, contion in both systems is that the estimated coefficient temporaneous cost models for futures prices at maon the cost variable is insignificantly different from turities greater than the length of the feeding period one (Bs = 1) in models where the time to maturity of were included.
8 Both of these systems provide evithe futures price variable is greater than the length of dence about the existence of rational pice formathe feeding period. That is, futures prices should tion. cotmoaeu otytmmdld -reflect costs in periods where supply decisions are The contemporaneous cost system modeled fuflexible. However, if rational price formation links tures prices as a function of actual costs over three futures prices to costs early in the contract life, and trading horizons identified in Figure 1 . The focus of if, after the placement period, futures prices symmetthe system was on the link between costs and futures rically move above and below costs in the sample of prices during the placement period. Futures prices data, then the estimated cost coefficient may conshould move with costs during this period. Further, tinue to be insignificantly different from one in some in the nearby contract trading horizon, the models nearby contract models. In other words, even if the should identify when the relationship between furelationship between futures prices and costs is detures prices and costs deteriorates. This illustrates teriorating, the tying of futures prices to costs early when the market views future supplies as fixed, or at in trading and to symmetric price adjustments after least when information on future supplies becomes the placement period may result in the appearance known. This is the time period when traders should that prices continue to move with costs during the nearby months. Thus, a sufficient condition is
Live Cattle Futures
To conserve space, parametric results for the seaing costs, but that this relationship is actually detesonal dummy variables are not presented (see riorating relative to the relationship in the placement Koontz et al. for the complete results). Parameter period. The sufficient condition is that the variance estimates for the seasonal dummies were as exof the estimated cost coefficient and the error varipected, suggesting significant seasonal variations in ance should be smallest for models of futures prices variable costs of feeding not captured by the USDA prior to and during the placement period.
budgets. The polynomial trend variables were not To summarize, if futures prices reflect feeding included in the final specification of the live cattle costs over the trading horizon when supply is not systems. Error variances of the models in the seemfixed, then the estimated cost coefficient should be ingly unrelated system with trend variables were insignificantly different from one, and the error varilarger than those of models with only the seasonal ance should be small. Once feeding commitments factors. are made and information on these commitments
The regression results linking feeding costs to live becomes available, the futures should reflect excattle futures prices over various times to contract pected market conditions and will not necessarily maturity were supportive of rational price formation mirror cost changes. This implies that the cost coefin the distant contract months. Table 1 presents the ficient is not necessarily equal to one and that the cost variable coefficient B 1 , the autoregressive error estimated cost coefficient variances and error variparameter p, model R-square, and model root error ances should increase significantly in models of ans s d i e sy in m s of variance a. In the contemporaneous cost models, the contracts closer to maturity. estimated cost coefficients were insignificantly dif-EMPIRICAL RESULTS ferent from one from the delivery month model through the model of prices seven months from Lagrange multiplier tests conducted on least delivery. The cost coefficient was significantly difsquares residuals of the two systems suggested that ferent from one at the 10 percent level in the eight cross equation correlation was persistent in both and and nine month models and at the 5 percent level in that seemingly unrelated regressions were approprithelO and 11 month models. The coefficients were ate (Breusch and Pagan) . Error diagnostics also sugsmaller than one in these cases, suggesting that fugested that a majority of the models in the two tures do not adjust fully to cost changes in the very systems exhibited first-order serial correlation distant months or that current actual costs do not (Kiviet) . 9 The results that follow are from models fully approximate future expected costs. Most imestimated via iterative seemingly unrelated regresportantly, futures prices move very closely with costs sions corrected for first-order serial correlation. Induring the placement period. Estimates of the cost itial estimates of the models using least squares and coefficients (and their standard errors) four, five, and a seemingly unrelated system identified the model six months prior to contract expiration were 1.0127 of futures prices five months from delivery as the (0.0235), 1.0180-(0.0223), and 0.9907 (0.0316). model with the smallest error variance. Thus, the The cost coefficient standard errors and root error specification of i and j in the incurred cost system variances declined as the time to contract maturity (equation 3) for both cattle and hogs was:j = 5 for i increased from the delivery month to five months = 0,...,5 andj = i for i = 6,...,11. 1 As a whole, results prior to delivery and remain fairly constant thereafsupported the rational price formation hypothesis as ter. The root error variance was $3.43/cwt. for the an explanation for price behavior of distant live cattle delivery month model and decreased to $2.04/cwt. and live hog futures contracts.
for the model of prices five months from delivery. 9 Higher order autoregressive or moving average patterns were not observed in the errors. The irregular temporal spacing of the hog futures contracts also suggested that a more complex error process was likely. If an autoregressive process of order one is observed between the bimonthly observations, the monthly observations between the June, July, and August contracts should exhibit an autoregressive moving average process, both of order one, where the parameters of the two processes are algebraically related to the original autoregressive term and there is but one free parameter (Harvey) . However, including the more complex error process in the systems of equations to capture a different structure between the bimonthly and monthly observations did not yield any statistical improvements. The simpler system with autoregressive errors of order one across all observations had some of the best statistical properties, and the findings were qualitatively identical to those of the more complex specification. The simpler specification is therefore reported. 10 The model with the smallest error variance may not bej = 5 after iteratively estimating the autocorrelated system; however, this lag length must be specified before estimation. (0.0782) (0.0119) (0.3888) tt and t denote significantly different from one at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. ** and * denote significantly different from zero at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. aStatistic for the one-tailed test of whether or not the error varianve of the model with FP(t) as the dependent variable is greaterthan the error variance of the remaining models. Statistic for the one-tailed test of whether or not the error variance of the model with FP(t-5) as the dependent variable is smallerthan the error variance of the remaining models. CStandard errors are in parentheses under parameter estimates. dP-values are in parentheses under test stastics and denote the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when the null is true.
Table 1 also presents two t-statistics which test
all supported rational price formation in the distant whether the error variance of the delivery month contract months. Futures prices consistently moved model (i = 0) was greater than the error variance for with costs of feeding from seven months prior to each of the other models (t-test 1), delivery until the delivery month. However, this (4) HAi : o < aT for i = 1, ... 11, relationship began to deteriorate two months from and whether the error variance of the model five delivery and had severely deteriorated one month months from delivery (i = 5) was less than the error from and during the delivery month. Up until two variance for each of the other models (t-test 2), months prior to the delivery month, futures contin-(5) HAi: aj < aT for i = 0,....,4 6,...,1l.
ued to reflect incurred costs of feeding. Between two Usually, testing the difference between variances months prior to and the delivery month, futures involves an F-statistic. However, this test requires moved with costs, but in a less systematic fashion. independence of the underlying random variables.
During the delivery month, the standard error and the Model errors within systems are dependent random root error variance were the largest of any of the variables. Therefore, the t-test outlined in Cox and months over the trading horizon. Hinkley (pp. 140-1) was used.
Live Hog Futures The values of t-test 1 for the contemporaneous cost models indicated that the error variances of the more As with the live cattle model results, results for the distant month models were significantly smaller live hog futures models supported rational price than the variance of the delivery month model. Error formation, although they were somewhat less convariances of the futures price models one and two clusive. Table 2 presents a portion of the findings, months from delivery were smaller than the delivery with the trend and seasonal results excluded. The month model error variance but not significantly trend and seasonal results were as expected. Feeding smaller. Error variances of models at the three, four, costs exhibited a trend that was declining at a deand nine month horizons were significantly smaller creasing rate and seasonal variations that were not at the 10 percent level. The remaining error varicaptured in the USDA budgets. ances, including that for the five month model, were
The estimated cost coefficients B 1 , autoregressive all significantly smaller than the delivery month error parameters p, R-squares, and root error varimodel error variance at the 5 percent level. The ance for the contemporaneous cost models are values of t-test 2 indicated that most of the error presented in Table 2 . In the contemporaneous cost variances m the contemporaneous cost system were system, most of the cost coefficients were signifinot significantly different from the error variance of s m o cantly different from one. However, the cost coeffithe model of futures five months from delivery.
. . cient in the model of futures prices seven months However, the error variances of the models of prices
^~.
~from delivery was not significantly different from one month from delivery and during the delivery e m h from d ery a dri t d ry one at the 10 percent level, and the cost coefficients month were significantly greater at the 5 percent i r iv level mn the five and eight months from delivery models were not significantly different from one at the 5 The incurred cost system displayed results similar percent level. Most importantly, during the feeding to those of the contemporaneous cost system. The commitment month, the fifth month prior to delivery, only difference is that, as expected, the cost coeffithe cost coefficient was 1.0448 with a standard error cients during the delivery and a nearby month were of 0.0567. Futures moved with costs very closely significantly different from one. One month prior, during this period. The root error variance of the and during the delivery month, futures prices were models was largest in the nearby and most distant unrelated to actual costs incurred five months prior.
months. The smallest root error variance was in the The root error variance was $4.50/cwt. for the delivfifth month model. This suggests that futures were ery month model and decreased to $1.91/cwt. for the most influenced by costs during the month when model of prices five months from delivery. The t-staanimals were committed to the feeding process. tistics for the incurred cost system revealed a pattern However, in the very distant contract month model, almost identical to that of the contemporaneous cost actual costs may not have approximated expected system. The error variance was smallest for the future costs well. model of futures prices five months prior to delivery Table 2 also reports t-statistics examining the difand largest for the model of prices during the delivference between the variance of the delivery month ery month. model and other error variances (t-test 1) and the The estimated cost coefficients, their standard erdifference between the variance of the five months rors, and the t-tests of the relative error variance sizes from delivery model and other models (t-test 2). As 241 tt and t denote significantly different from one at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. ** and * denote significantly different from zero at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. aStatistic for the one-tailed test of whether or not the error variance of the model with FP(t) as the dependent variable is greater than the error variance of the remaining models. Statistic for the one-tailed test of whether or not the error variance of the model with FP(t-5) as the dependent variable is smallerthan the error variance of the remaining models. CStandard errors are in parentheses under parameter estimates. dP-values are in parentheses under test stastics and denote the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when the null is true.
with the cattle models, the error variance of the able portion of the model. The live hog models reveal delivery month model was one of the largest, and the positive and negative serial correlation. The negative error variance of the model five months from delivserial correlation suggested that if futures were ery was one of the smallest.
priced at a premium to variable costs for one conThe differences between the incurred cost and tract, at a given maturity, the following contract contemporaneous cost live hog model results were would be priced at a discount during the same dissimilar to the differences in the cattle model findings.
tance from maturity, correcting for trends and seaThe cost coefficients in the incurred cost system sonality. This reaffirms the reactive nature of the live were insignificantly different from one at the two, hog futures prices in their movements around costs. three, five, seven, and eight month horizons. At the Cross equation correlations of errors are presented one month horizon and during the delivery month, for the cattle systems in Table 3 and the hog systems movements in futures prices did not mirror movein Table 4 . The correlation between neighboring ments in variable costs during the placement period, maturity month models was positive and relatively The deteriorating relationship was affirmed by the large for both cattle and hog systems. If futures for increasing root error variance from the models as the a given contract were priced at a premium (discount) time-to-maturity horizon diminished. The findings to variable feeding costs during a particular calendar suggested that the live hog futures contracts were month, then it is likely that futures would be priced priced in a manner consistent with rational price at a premium (discount) to costs one calendar month formation during periods prior to the commitment of later. Most of the other correlations were close to animals to feed or at least where future supplies were zero with the exception of the negative correlations not well known. Then, as the delivery month apbetween placement period models and the delivery preached, the relationship between futures prices month model errors for the incurred cost system for and costs at placement deteriorated.
cattle and the contemporaneous cost system for hogs.
Differences Between Live Cattle and Live Hogs
The difference between cattle and hog correlations There were interesting differences between the live in the systems may be related to the extent of inforcattle and live hog futures prices and average cost of mation in the respective markets. The contemporafeeding relationships over different maturity horineous cost system results for live cattle suggested zons. Live cattle futures prices did not react to that if futures were priced at a premium (discount) changes in cattle feeding variable costs as much as to contemporaneous costs they would continue to be the live hog futures react to changes in hog feeding priced at a premium (discount) over much of the variable costs. In the live cattle models, the estimated contract life. This suggests that feeder animal supcost coefficients were usually less than one, or were plies, and therefore live animal supplies, may be greater than one by less than one standard error. The fixed to a degree over the trading horizon of a year. live hog cost coefficients were, in most cases, greater
The incurred costs system results suggested that if than one with several being significantly greater than futures were priced at a premium (discount) to varione. The results suggested that the live hog futures able feeding costs during some of the distant months market was more sensitive to changes in variable (six and seven months from delivery) and after placecosts. Alternatively, a significant portion of cattle ments occur (two to four months from delivery), then slaughter are nonfed animals. The supply of these futures would be priced at a discount (premium) to animals responds to changes in cattle prices but not incurred variable costs during the delivery month. to cattle feeding costs. The hog market has a smaller
The live cattle futures market may provide overly nonfed counterpart. The reactive nature of hog fupessimistic or optimistic profit margin outlooks two, tures prices to cost changes also appeared in the three, four, six, and seven months from delivery, autoregressive parameter and cross equation corresuggesting that there is, to some degree, a self-delation results.
feating supply response. The correlation between the In the live cattle models, mild positive serial corpremiums and discounts offered during the fifth relation of errors was observed. The exception was month prior to delivery and the delivery month prewith the four and five months from delivery contemmiums and discounts was not significant. poraneous cost models where there was no signifiContemporaneous cost system correlations for the cant serial correlation. Positive serial correlation hog models confirmed the reactive nature of the suggested that there was a systematic component in market. Negative correlations between the three the model not explained by costs or by the other nearby month model errors and the model errors of independent variables, and that this systematic comthe more distant months in the contemporaneous ponent adjusted slowly around the independent varicost system suggested that premiums (discounts) offered early in the contract life were reversed as the future supplies with variable cost of feeding inforcontract matured. The incurred cost system correlamation to a greater extent than the cattle market. The tions were primarily positive but small. The hog reactionary nature of the hog market appears appromarket, more so than the cattle market, did not offer priate given the absence of self-defeating supply incentives or disincentives early in the contract life responses measured in the incurred cost system corthat were later self-defeated by a supply response.
relations. This is consistent with the inflexible nature of hog feeding decisions once breeding decisions have been IMPLICATIONS FOR HEDGING made. However, it appeared to take the live hog
The presence of rational price formation in livefutures market four to six months to become comstock futures markets suggests that cattle and hog fortable with the supply numbers (initially available producers need to approach preplacement hedging in bred sow intentions) and to begin to forecast future with realistic price objectives. Prices for live cattle market conditions. This suggests some flexibility in futures contracts generally move in tandem with slaughter of bred sows and young pigs, or in the use variable costs of feeding until the futures contract is of gilts in the breeding herd. Compared with the live two months from delivery. Prices for live hog futures cattle market, the hog market appeared to be more contracts move with variable costs of feeding during nervous and reactionary. This may be due to inforthe fifth month prior to delivery but react strongly to mational differences between the markets. USDA cost changes at other times. If cattle and hog producinventory reports are released monthly for cattle but ers have an objective of establishing profit margin quarterly for hogs. The hog market must anticipate hedges prior to placing the animals on feed, they 244 cannot expect to hedge substantially above variable probability of observing live cattle futures trading at feeding costs. Figures 2 and 3 are histograms of the a $2/cwt. or greater discount under USDA feeding probability of observing specific differences ($/cwt.) budget figures during the placement period is less between futures prices and USDA variable costs of than 2 percent. However, during the delivery month, feeding. Figure 2 presents, for cattle, the probability futures have been $2/cwt. or more under incurred of differences between costs five months from delivcosts 23 percent of the time." The same phenomena ery and futures five months from delivery, and behold for higher prices. Futures prices during the tween costs five months from delivery and futures in placement month have traded in excess of $4/cwt. the delivery month. The histograms were conabove USDA feeding costs approximately 12 perstructed using two dollar-per-hundredweight intercent of the time. However, during delivery months vals; the midpoints of the intervals are indicated on futures have been in excess of incurred costs by the horizontal figure axes.
$4/cwt. for approximately 40 percent of the time. The probability of observing large positive or A similar pattern is revealed for hogs in Figure 3 . negative differences between futures prices and Large positive or negative differences between fufeeding costs incurred at placement was greater for tures prices and actual hog feeding costs were more the delivery month futures prices than for placement likely to be observed in the delivery month than in month futures prices. For example, in Figure 2, observed below USDA variable feeding costs five variable costs by hedging prior to placement. This is months prior to delivery. However, during the delivthe standard risk/return tradeoff of portfolio theory. ery month futures' have been observed below the Thus, the crucial observation is that the producer actual feeding costs 10 percent of the time. Likewise, who hedges at or before placement can reduce the futures prices have been observed in excess of feedprobability of losses, but very profitable returns are ing costs by $14/cwt. only 1 percent of the time also eliminated. during the placement month. However, during the delivery month, this difference has been observed 25 CONCLUSIONS percent of the time.
Rational price formation is generally supported by Caution should be used in interpreting the level of the behavior of distant live cattle and live hog futures the difference between futures prices and USDA prices. Distant futures contracts trade at prices average variable feeding costs as profits or, more around the average costs of feeding during the time accurately, as returns to fixed costs. The magnitudes period when a supply response is possible. However, may be biased upward, as USDA costs have been after feeding commitments are made, market prices found to be higher than industry costs (Trapp) . Furlikely adjust to reflect expected market conditions as ther, the futures price must be adjusted for basis to those conditions become known. As a result, liveobtain a cash price. The issue at hand is the wide stock futures markets forecast poorly at longer time spread between futures prices and cost at the time of horizons and improve as the contract nears maturity. delivery and the narrow spread during the placement Evidence of rational price formation suggests that an months. Bias in returns to fixed costs will not affect analytical framework which attempts to draw market the spreads observed. Therefore, if a cattle feedlot efficiency conclusions based solely on forecast peroperator's feeding costs are consistently $2/cwt.
formance is too stringent because, it ignores the lower than the USDA feeding budget, then it appears arbitrage between futures markets and feeding decithat the producer can establish a price, by hedging sions. prior to placement, covering feeding costs more than
The live cattle futures market exhibits rational 97 percent of the time. However, 88 percent of the price formation to a greater degree than does the live time the feeder will earn less than $4/cwt. above hog futures market. This may be due to the level of 246 uncertainty in the respective production processes. hedger will effectively manage costs and establish In the hog market, there is more supply uncertainty hedges when futures prices offer costs plus a reasonbecause government reports are less frequent. Also, able rate of return. Rational price formation limits hog production may be more uncertain as it may be the futures market from offering significant profits more influenced by weather, disease, birth rates, and during the phase of a contract's life when future other factors. For live cattle, the decision most affectsupplies can still be influenced. The market does not ing rational price formation is whether animals are offer significant losses during this time period either. finished or left in backgrounding programs. This
Beyond the period when a supply response can ocdifference between live cattle and live hog futures cur, more profitable hedging opportunities may arise markets appears to merit further investigation, and a more selective approach to hedging may yield From the viewpoint of the decision maker interhigher returns. However, the higher returns are ofested in using live cattle or hog futures markets to fered only in exchange for the higher level of risk manage price risk, the results have implications for associated with having unhedged production after hedging strategy selection as well as for identifying the supply response period, where there is potential the type of producer who can use futures to hedge for price decreases as the market accumulates inforeffectively. The results suggest that the successful mation.
